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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Like many states in this nation, the State of Florida has enacted a 
comprehensive set of workers compensation laws to assure the 
quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an 
injured worker and to facilitate the workers return to gainful em-
ployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.1 Floridas workers 
compensation system is based on a mutual renunciation of common-
law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.2 A criti-
cal aspect of this mutual renunciation of rights is the concept of 
                                                                                                                      
 * Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Susan C. Bucklew, United States District Court, 
Middle District of Florida. B.S., University of South Carolina, 1996; J.D., Florida State 
University, 1999. 
 1. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000). 
 2. Id. 
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workers compensation exclusivity or workers compensation immu-
nity.3 In simple terms, Floridas workers compensation exclusivity 
statute provides tort immunity to an employer when an employee is 
injured within the course of his or her employment, so long as the 
employer has a valid workers compensation policy in place.4 The Su-
preme Court of Florida in Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc.5 has 
explained the rationale: 
[T]he concept of exclusiveness of remedy embodied in Fla.Stat. 
§ 440.11, F.S.A. appears to be a rational mechanism for making 
the compensation system work in accord with the purposes of the 
Act. In return for accepting vicarious liability for all work-related 
injuries regardless of fault, and surrendering his traditional de-
fenses and superior resources for litigation, the employer is al-
lowed to treat compensation as a routine cost of doing business 
which can be budgeted for without fear of any substantial adverse 
tort judgments. Similarly, the employee trades his tort remedies 
for a system of compensation without contest, thus sparing him 
the cost, delay, and uncertainty of a claim in litigation.6 
 Although workers compensation immunity protects an employer 
from most work-related tort lawsuits, the exclusivity provision of sec-
tion 440.11, Florida Statutes, does not insulate an employer from in-
tentional tort lawsuits brought by employees.7 In other words, em-
ployers are provided with immunity from suit by their employees so 
long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed 
to result in or that is substantially certain to result in injury or death 
to the employee.8 While the Florida Legislature has not statutorily 
mandated an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of 
section 440.11, the Florida Supreme Court has held that such an ex-
ception is logically part of Floridas workers compensation scheme.9 
Given this fact, courts in Florida have been largely, if not exclusively, 
responsible for defining the parameters of the intentional tort excep-
tion to workers compensation immunity.10 In forming this judicially 
created exception, courts in Florida have been less than sure as to 
what actually constitutes an intentional tort.11 In fact, the Supreme 
Court of Florida has recently reversed some of its own rulings that 
define the scope of the intentional tort exception to workers compen-
                                                                                                                      
 3. See id. § 440.11. 
 4. See John T. Burnett & Kyle L. Redfearn, Workers Compensation Immunity and 
Intentional Torts: How To Be Substantially Certain in Defending Your Case, TRIAL 
ADVOC. Q., Spring, 1999, at 15, 15. 
 5. 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972). 
 6. Id. at 365. 
 7. See Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1993). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 2000). 
 10. See infra Part III.B. 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
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sation immunity.12 At the heart of the confusion over what consti-
tutes an intentional tort under Florida workers compensation law is 
the phrase substantially certain to result in injury or death as used 
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Fisher v. Shenandoah General 
Construction Co.13 and Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Products, Inc.14 
In those cases, the supreme court implied that an employer is pro-
vided immunity from suit by his or her employees so long as the em-
ployer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in, or 
that is substantially certain to result in, injury or death to the em-
ployee.15 Subsequent to those opinions, Florida courts have embraced 
various views as to what substantially certain to result in injury or 
death to the employee actually means.16 Even with the Florida Su-
preme Courts recent attempt in Turner v. PCR, Inc. to clarify what 
substantially certain means in the context of workers compensa-
tion immunity, the exact definition of the term still remains vague.17 
Due to this confusion as to what constitutes an intentional tort under 
Floridas workers compensation law, this Article suggests that the 
Florida Legislature enact a statutory intentional tort exception to the 
exclusivity provisions found in section 440.11, Florida Statutes.  
 Part II of this Article explores the policies behind workers com-
pensation immunity and the rise of the intentional tort exception. 
Part III discusses the statutory and common law development of ex-
ceptions to workers compensation immunity in Florida and examines 
the changes in the court-created substantial certainty standard. 
Part IV deals with recent court opinions that have attempted to clar-
ify what constitutes an intentional tort and specifically examines the 
Florida Supreme Courts recent holding in Turner v. PCR, Inc. Part 
IV also addresses the continued uncertainty as to what substan-
tially certain to result in injury or death to the employee means. Fi-
nally, Part V argues for a statutorily defined intentional tort excep-
tion to the exclusivity provisions found in section 440.11, Florida 
Statutes. Part V also proposes a definition that could be used in a 
statutory intentional tort exception and shows how that proposed 
definition is workable in the context of past Florida cases. 
                                                                                                                      
 12. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687. 
 13. 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 14. 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; see 
also Burnett & Redfearn, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that the term substantially certain 
is often misconstrued in the workers compensation arena). 
 15. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 880. 
 16. See infra Part III.B. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
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II.   THE POLICIES BEHIND WORKERS COMPENSATION IMMUNITY AND 
THE RISE OF AN INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION 
A.   Policies Behind Workers Compensation Immunity 
 As noted above, the workers compensation system in Florida is 
based in part on a renunciation of common law rights and defenses 
by employers. In exchange for those common law rights and defenses, 
the employer is allowed to treat compensation as a routine cost of 
doing business which can be budgeted for without fear of any sub-
stantial adverse tort judgments.18 A logical concomitant to this ex-
change of rights is the concept of an exclusive remedy for injured 
employees.19 In other words, before an employer can be asked to ac-
cept virtual strict liability as to workplace injuries, the employer 
must first be afforded some sort of immunity from tort actions based 
on such injuries. Acknowledging this reality, the Florida Legislature 
has mandated that, as a general rule, workers compensation is an 
injured workers exclusive remedy for qualifying workplace injuries.20 
Specifically, section 440.11, Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part 
that, [t]he liability of an employer prescribed in [the workers com-
pensation statute] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability 
of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the em-
ployee . . . on account of [a covered] injury or death . . . .21 
 In addition to protecting an employer from tort lawsuits based on 
certain workplace injuries, the exclusivity of workers compensation 
also extends to coemployees and supervisory employees in certain 
circumstances.22 Much like employers, coemployees of an injured 
worker are generally protected from tort lawsuits based on qualifying 
workplace injuries unless they act with willful and wanton disre-
gard or unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence 
when such acts result in injury or death.23 Supervisory or 
managerial employees are provided similar immunity as long as they 
do not act in a manner that would constitute a violation of the law 
punishable by a term of sixty days of imprisonment as set forth in 
section 775.082, Florida Statutes.24 
 Although the immunity provided to coemployees and manage-
rial/supervisory employees is limited on the face of the exclusivity 
statute itself, there is no similar limitation of employer liability 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Mullarkey v. Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 1972). 
 19. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (2000). 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. § 440.11(1). 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
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found in the statute.25 In other words, while employee immunity is 
limited by the standards of gross negligence and culpable negligence, 
an employers workers compensation immunity is not specifically 
limited on the face of section 440.11. Therefore, it would appear that 
the plain language of the workers compensation immunity statute 
would shield an employer from tort liability even if the employer had 
engaged in conduct that was intentionally designed to injure its em-
ployees. In 1986, Floridas Fourth District Court of Appeal certified 
the following question to the Florida Supreme Court in two compan-
ion cases: Does the Florida workers compensation law preclude ac-
tions by employees against their corporate employers for intentional 
torts even though the injuries were incurred within the scope of their 
employment?26 
 In both of the cases in which this question was certified, the su-
preme court refused to provide an answer to the question as asked.27 
Rather, the supreme court restated the certified question and deter-
mined that as a matter of law, the conduct at issue in the certified 
cases did not constitute an intentional tort.28 In other words, the su-
preme court found that there was no need to determine whether an 
intentional tort falls within the scope of workers compensation im-
munity because the conduct at issue in the two certified cases did not 
rise to the level of an intentional tort.29 Although the supreme court 
did not answer the fundamental question underlying the two certi-
fied cases, it did provide a rough definition as to what constitutes an 
intentional tort under Florida workers compensation law. In fact, 
the two opinions in Lawton and Fisher gave birth to the substan-
tially certain to result in injury or death to the employee standard 
that is the subject of this Article. 
B.   The Rise of an Intentional Tort Exception to Workers 
Compensation Immunity 
 In Fisher the court recognized that an intentional tort is usually 
based on a deliberate intent to injure another.30 However, in most 
employment situations, one can safely assume that employers will 
not engage in conduct that is designed to intentionally injure an em-
                                                                                                                      
 25. See id. This observation goes only to the conduct limitations (i.e., gross negligence 
and culpable negligence) found in the exclusivity statute and not to other immunity limita-
tions based on nonconduct factors such as the existence of a valid workers compensation 
policy. 
 26. Fisher v. Shenandoah General Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 882 (Fla. 1986), over-
ruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 
498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 27. See cases cited supra note 26. 
 28. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 881. 
 29. See Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 881. 
 30. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883. 
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ployee.31 Nonetheless, while most employers do not intentionally try 
to hurt their employees, some employers engage in conduct that is so 
dangerous that an intent to injure can be inferred from their con-
duct.32 In light of this fact, the court in Fisher turned to the precepts 
of traditional tort law as stated in the matter of Spivey v. Battaglia33 
to define an intentional tort.34 In Spivey, the Florida Supreme Court 
decided whether an unsolicited hug given to a plaintiff constituted a 
battery when the person who gave the hug did not have any actual 
intent to injure the plaintiff but injured her nonetheless.35 Holding 
that the hug in question did not constitute a battery, the court in 
Spivey stated that [w]here a reasonable man would believe that a 
particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be held 
in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it.36 Adopting the 
logic behind the courts decision in Spivey, the court in Fisher further 
defined the concept of substantial certainty using the words of Pro-
fessor Prosser: 
[T]he mere knowledge and appreciation of a risksomething 
short of substantial certaintyis not intent. The defendant who 
acts in the belief or consciousness that the act is causing an appre-
ciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is 
great the conduct may be characterized as reckless and wanton, 
but is not an intentional wrong.37 
 In Lawton the supreme court reiterated the language cited above 
from Spivey and Professor Prosser by citing to its decision in Fisher.38 
However, the court in Lawton stated that the substantially certain 
standard expressed in Fisher requires more than a strong probabil-
ity of injury. It requires virtual certainty.39 Thus, while the court in 
Lawton and Fisher did not determine whether suits for intentional 
torts are barred by employers workers compensation immunity, the 
court did give a rough definition as to what constitutes an intentional 
tort under workers compensation law, and it gave two factual exam-
ples of what is not intentional behavior on the part of an employer. 
 Despite the supreme courts reluctance to decide the issue of 
whether workers compensation immunity barred suits for inten-
                                                                                                                      
 31. Burnett & Redfearn, supra note 4, at 15. 
 32. See id. at 16. 
 33. 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972). 
 34. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883 (citing Spivey). 
 35. See Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 817.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 36 (5th ed. 
1984)). 
 38. See Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in 
part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 39. Id. The court in Fisher also spoke generally in terms of virtual certainty, see 
Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884, but the court in Lawton announced this requirement in more ex-
press terms.  
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tional injury, Justice James C. Adkins, in his dissent in Fisher, ar-
gued that when read in conjunction with the rest of the workers 
compensation statute, section 440.11 clearly does not provide immu-
nity for employers against intentional-injury tort lawsuits.40 Noting 
that sections 440.09(1) and 440.02(14) limit compensation to acci-
dents arising out of and in the course of employment, Justice Adkins 
contended that an intentional tort can never be accidental and thus 
can never be within the purview of the workers compensation exclu-
sivity provision.41 Additionally, Justice Adkins noted that with the 
exception of Delaware, no state in the nation prohibits an employee 
from bringing an intentional tort action due to a workers compensa-
tion exclusivity provision.42 Notwithstanding Justice Adkins dissent 
on the issue, however, the question of whether Floridas exclusivity 
statute bars intentional tort claims was officially left open until 1994, 
when the supreme court issued its opinion in Eller v. Shova.43  
 In Eller, the supreme court relied on its prior holdings in Lawton 
and Fisher and stated that there is an intentional tort exception to 
workers compensation immunity in Florida.44 In doing so, the court 
adopted the substantially certain language that was used in Fisher 
and Lawton as part of what constitutes an excluded intentional 
tort.45 Subsequent to the courts opinion in Eller, the Florida district 
courts of appeal have never seriously questioned the propriety of the 
supreme courts proclamation of an intentional tort exception to 
workers compensation immunity.46 In fact, the Supreme Court of 
Florida still relies on its opinion in Eller to support its intentional 
tort exception.47 As noted above, however, such an exception has 
never been codified by the Florida Legislature in the workers com-
pensation statutes.48 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 885 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1994). 
 44. Eller, 630 So. 2d at 539. The courts reliance on Lawton and Fisher as support for 
an intentional tort exception is curious due to the fact that the court in Lawton and Fisher 
specifically refused to address the intentional tort exception issue. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 2000). However, in an opinion 
prior to Eller, Judge Michael E. Allen noted, in concurrence, that reliance on Fisher and 
Lawton for support of an intentional tort exception was misplaced. See Timones v. Excel 
Indus., 631 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (Allen, J., concurring).  
 47. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 686.  
 48. See FLA. STAT. § 440.01-.60 (2000). It is interesting to note that in the past, the 
Florida Legislature has amended the workers compensation exclusivity provision in re-
sponse to the supreme courts interpretation of immunity under section 440.11. See Eller, 
630 So. 2d at 540 (discussing the so-called Streeter Amendment of 1988, which provide[d] 
for heightened immunity to policymaking types of employees by raising the degree of neg-
ligence necessary to maintain a civil tort action against such employees from gross negli-
gence to culpable negligence when those employees are engaged in managerial or policy-
making decisions). In light of this fact, one could argue that through its silence, the legis-
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III.   WORKERS COMPENSATION IMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
IMMUNITY EXCEPTIONS 
 As seen above, workers compensation immunity in Florida is not 
without its limits. Since the passage of workers compensation legis-
lation in Florida, statutory and common law exceptions have been 
created to temper the exclusivity of the workers compensation rem-
edy. To better understand the development of the common law inten-
tional tort exception for employers, one must first look to the statu-
tory exceptions to immunity that have been mandated by the Florida 
Legislature. 
A.   Statutory Exceptions to Workers Compensation Immunity 
 To appreciate the statutory exceptions to workers compensation 
immunity in Florida, one must begin with a fictional baseline propo-
sition that employers and their employees are completely immune 
from all tort suits arising from workplace injuries that qualify for 
workers compensation payments under the law. With this fictional 
base in mind, the first statutory exception to workers compensation 
immunity relates to employees who are injured by their coworkers. 
As noted above, coemployees of an injured worker are generally pro-
tected from tort lawsuits based on qualifying workplace injuries 
unless they act with willful and wanton disregard or unprovoked 
physical aggression or with gross negligence when such acts result in 
injury or death.49 As a general matter, courts in Florida have had lit-
tle trouble in applying the coemployee immunity exception and have 
defined the statutes reference to gross negligence as an act or omis-
sion that a reasonable, prudent person would know is likely to result 
in injury to another.50  
 The second statutory exception to workers compensation immu-
nity relates to managerial and supervisory employees. Supervisory or 
managerial employees are provided tort immunity as long as they do 
not act in a manner that would constitute a violation of the law pun-
ishable by a term of sixty days or more of imprisonment as set forth 
                                                                                                                      
lature has approved the supreme courts creation of an intentional tort exception to work-
ers compensation immunity in Florida. Assuming the merits of such an argument, this Ar-
ticle asserts that a legislatively defined intentional tort exception is needed to provide clar-
ity as to the scope of that exception under the law. 
 49. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2000). 
 50. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687 n.3 (quoting Eller, 630 So. 2d at 541 n.3);. Prior to the 
1988 amendment to section 440.11, courts typically defined gross negligence as follows: (1) 
a composite of circumstances that constitute imminent or clear and present danger 
amounting to more than normal and usual peril; (2) predicated on a showing of chargeable 
knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger; and (3) a conscious disregard of conse-
quences. See, e.g., Kline v. Rubio, 652 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Foreman v. 
Russo, 624 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).  
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in section 775.082, Florida Statutes.51 This immunity is often referred 
to as the culpable negligence exception to workers compensation 
immunity.52 To hold a supervisory employee liable in tort for com-
pensable workplace injuries, an employee must prove that the super-
visor, through culpable negligence, actively inflicted injury on the 
employee.53 Florida case law has defined culpable negligence as being 
of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard 
for the safety of others. It is that entire want of care which raises a 
presumption of indifference to consequences.54 
 Given the explanations of the two statutory exceptions discussed 
above, it can be argued that a reader of the plain language of section 
440.11, Florida Statutes, would be left with the following assump-
tions: 
(1) an employer who has a valid workers compensation policy in 
place is immune from all tort suits brought by employees who are 
injured in the course and scope of their employment; and 
(2) a supervisory or managerial employee of such an employer is 
immune from tort suits brought by employees who are injured in 
the course and scope of their employment so long as the manage-
rial or supervisory employee does not actively inflict injury on the 
employee in question through negligence of a gross and flagrant 
character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of oth-
ers and which raises a presumption of indifference to conse-
quences; and 
(3) a coemployee is immune from tort lawsuits based on injuries 
sustained by other employees who are injured in the course and 
scope of their employment so long as the coemployee does not act 
with willful and wanton disregard, unprovoked physical aggres-
sion, or with gross negligence that a reasonable, prudent person 
would know is likely to result in injury to another. 
Although the second and third assumptions noted above are correct 
under Florida law, the assumption that an employer is immune from 
all tort suits brought by employees who are injured in the course and 
scope of their employment is not. This is so because of the supreme 
courts intentional tort exception to employer immunity. 
                                                                                                                      
 51. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2000). This immunity also applies to any sole proprie-
tor, partner, corporate officer or director, . . . or other person who in the scope of his or her 
employment duties acts in a managerial or policymaking capacity. Id.  
 52. See e.g., Kennedy v. Moree, 650 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Emer-
gency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). 
 53. See Kennedy, 650 So. 2d at 1107. 
 54. Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), quoted in Kennedy, 650 So. 
2d at 1107. 
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B.   The Intentional Tort Exception to Employer Immunity 
 With the birth of the intentional tort exception to employer im-
munity explored above, the development of the definition of that ex-
ception in Florida court opinions must now be examined. 
1.   The Definitive Cases 
 As noted above, the two cases that initially attempted to define 
the intentional tort exception to workers compensation immunity are 
Fisher and Lawton. Also noted above, the supreme court in Fisher 
and Lawton defined an intentional tort as any intentional act de-
signed to result in, or that is substantially certain to result in injury 
or death to the employee.55 Despite the use of the term substan-
tially certain in Fisher and Lawton, however, the supreme court 
spoke in terms of virtual certainty in both of those opinions.56 Thus, 
after the opinions in Fisher and Lawton, the definition of an inten-
tional tort, as that term relates to workers compensation immunity, 
could be understood as any intentional act designed to result in, or 
that is substantially certain (meaning virtually certain) to result in, 
injury or death to the employee. Standing alone, this definition of an 
intentional tort does little to explain what substantially certain or 
virtually certain actually mean. To be sure, after Fisher and 
Lawton, all that was known was that substantial or virtual cer-
tainty means more than a strong probability of injury, greater than 
gross[ly] negligen[t] conduct, and greater than reckless and wan-
ton conduct.57 More instructive than the actual definitions provided 
by the court in Fisher and Lawton, however, are the facts of the 
Fisher case, in light of the courts holding that no intentional tort was 
committed in that matter. 
 In Fisher, the plaintiffs complaint alleged that the defendant-
employer required its employees to enter pipes that contained poi-
sonous gases in order to clean the pipes with high pressure hoses.58 
The plaintiff further alleged that the employer failed to provide its 
employees with oxygen masks, gas detection equipment, rescue 
equipment, and other safety equipment required under federal law.59 
Additionally, the complaint in Fisher alleged that the employer 
forced its employees to deliberately evade safety inspections so as to 
prevent the company from being cited for safety violations.60 As a re-
                                                                                                                      
 55. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986), overruled 
in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc. 498 So. 
2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 56. See Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 880; Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884. 
 57. Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883-84; Lawton, 498 So. 2d at 881. 
 58. See Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
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sult of the employers actions, the complaint alleged, an employee, 
Shaun E. Fisher, died from inhaling noxious methane gas.61 Despite 
these apparently atrocious facts, the court in Fisher held that, even if 
true, the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint did not rise to the 
level of an intentional tort.62 Thus, the court in Fisher set a high fac-
tual standard as to what constitutes substantial or virtual cer-
tainty of injury or death under Florida workers compensation law. 
 After the supreme courts decision in Fisher, two appellate courts 
issued opinions in which the courts found an intentional tort excep-
tion to workers compensation immunity. Specifically, the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.63 and 
the Third District Court of Appeal in Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc.64 
found that an employers conduct was substantially certain to result 
in injury or death to an employee.65  
 In Cunningham, the plaintiffs alleged that their employer en-
gaged in the following acts: (1) diverting a smokestack so that fumes 
would flow into, rather than outside of, the plant where the employ-
ees worked; (2) periodically turning off the plant ventilation system; 
(3) removing warning labels on toxic substance containers; (4) mis-
representing the toxic nature of substances; (5) knowingly refusing to 
provide safety equipment; and (6) misrepresenting the need for 
safety equipment and the dangers associated with working at a cer-
tain plant.66 In holding that the employers conduct rose to the level 
of an intentional tort, the court in Cunningham distinguished its 
case from the supreme courts opinion in Fisher: 
The present case differs from Fisher, wherein the complaint al-
leged that in all probability injury would result to the employee 
from a one-time exposure to a dangerous gas. Here, the allegations 
are that injury was a substantial certainty and that there was 
repeated, continued exposure that was intentionally increased and 
worsened by [the employers] deliberate and malicious conduct.67 
Thus, according to the First District Court in Cunningham, sub-
stantial or virtual certainty appears to require repeated and con-
tinued conduct that is deliberate and malicious and sounding in 
fraud and deceit.68 
 In Connelly, the evidence before the court suggested that the em-
ployer of the deceased plaintiffs engaged in the following conduct: (1) 
                                                                                                                      
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. at 884. 
 63. 558 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 
 64. 568 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 65. See Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 97; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.   
 66. See Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96. 
 67. Id. at 97. 
 68. Id.  
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intentionally misstating the weight capacity of an aircraft; (2) inten-
tionally and repeatedly keeping its aircraft in a defective condition; 
(3) concealing actual flight loads which resulted in reduced thrust 
and erroneous fuel calculations; (4) ignoring reports of imminent 
equipment failure; and (5) economically coercing employees to fly in 
violation of Federal Aviation Association regulations.69 Eventually, 
one of the employers airplanes crashed as a result of the conduct 
listed above, and the court found that the employer had engaged in 
conduct that was substantially certain to result in injury or death to 
its employees.70 Much like the First District Court in Cunningham, 
the Third District Court in Connelly appeared to base its finding of 
substantially certain conduct on, inter alia, the fact that the em-
ployer in that matter routinely engaged in highly irresponsible be-
havior that was rooted in deceit and misrepresentation.71 In fact, the 
court in Connelly specifically connected the withholding of informa-
tion to the substantially certain standard: 
[W]here the employer, as in this case, withholds from an employee, 
knowledge of a defect or hazard which poses a grave threat of in-
jury so that the employee is not permitted to exercise an informed 
judgment whether to perform the assigned task, the employer will 
be considered to have acted in a belief that harm is substantially 
certain to occur.72 
 The opinions in Connelly and Cunningham were the first post-
Lawton/Fisher cases to give factual examples of what constitutes 
substantial or virtual certainty under the supreme courts inten-
tional tort exception. Thus, by taking the supreme courts opinions in 
Fisher and Lawton together with the district courts opinions in Con-
nelly and Cunningham, substantially certain conduct can be de-
fined as conduct that has more than a strong probability of injury;73 
that is greater than gross[ly] negligen[t];74 that is greater than 
reckless or wanton;75 that arises from repeated, continued con-
duct;76 or that has an element of deceit that prevents an employee 
from exercis[ing] an informed judgment whether to perform [an] as-
signed task.77 
                                                                                                                      
 69. See Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449. 
 70. See id. at 451. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. (quoting Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1052 (1984)).  
 73. Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods, Inc., 498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), over-
ruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 74. Id. at 881.  
 75. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 884 (Fla. 1986), overruled 
in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 76. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).  
 77. Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451. 
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2.   The Formative Cases 
 After the opinions in Lawton, Fisher, Connelly, and Cunningham, 
Florida courts were left with an enigmatic and multifaceted defini-
tion of what constitutes conduct that is substantially or virtually cer-
tain to result in injury or death. Florida courts were also left with 
two factual examples of what constituted an intentional tort and two 
factual examples of what did not constitute intentional behavior. In 
the wake of those four decisions, the district-level appellate courts in 
Florida from 1991 to late 1998 consistently held that various em-
ployer conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional tort under 
the substantially certain standard.78 Those opinions are based on 
various sets of logic and reasoning. In ruling that an employers con-
duct did not rise to the level of an intentional tort via the substan-
tially certain standard, some courts relied on the absence of deceit-
ful conduct by the employer.79 Other courts relied on the strong vir-
tual certainty language used by the supreme court in Lawton and 
Fisher,80 while others based their decisions on somewhat novel 
grounds.81  
 Notwithstanding the lack of uniformity in reasoning among courts 
when evaluating alleged intentional behavior on the part of employ-
                                                                                                                      
 78. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 732 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), quashed, 754 So. 2d 
683 (Fla. 2000); Williamson v. Water Mania, Inc., 721 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); 
Wilks v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 691 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Gustafsons Dairy, Inc. 
v. Phiel, 681 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), holding limited in not relevant part by Hast-
ings v. Demming, 694 So. 2d 718 (1997); Walton Dodge Chrysler-Plymouth Jeep & Eagle, 
Inc. v. H.C. Hodges Cash & Carry, Inc., 679 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), abrogated by 
Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); Clark v. Gumbys Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So. 
2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), abrogated by Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); 
Subileau v. Southern Forming, Inc., 664 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Mekamy Oaks, Inc. 
v. Snyder, 659 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); United Parcel Serv. v. Welsh, 659 So. 2d 
1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), abrogated by Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); 
Thompson v. Coker Fuel, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), abrogated by Turner v. 
PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc. v. Dipaolo, 653 So. 
2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), abrogated by Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000); 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. David, 632 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Timones v. 
Excel Indus.; 631 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Mirabal v. Cachurra Corp., 580 So. 2d 
285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).  
 79. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) 
(noting no intentional misrepresentation to employee); Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 1130 (not-
ing that the employer did not deceive the injured employee); General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 632 So. 2d at 126 (noting the elements of deceit in Cunningham and Connelly); Ti-
mones, 631 So. 2d at 333 (same). 
 80. See, e.g., Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc., 653 So. 2d at 1132 (recognizing that the 
virtual certainty standard is used by courts that have found intentional behavior); Mira-
bal, 580 So. 2d at 286 (stating that the substantially certain standard requires virtual 
certainty of injury or death). 
 81. See, e.g., Williamson, 721 So. 2d at 375 (implying that some sort of employer pre-
meditation is required under the substantially certain standard); Walton Dodge Chrysler-
Plymouth Jeep & Eagle, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 830 (implying that the substantially certain 
standard requires affirmative acts by the employer that increase the risk of harm to the 
employee).  
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ers, a common theme eventually developed in workers compensation 
immunity cases. Although court opinions dealing with workers com-
pensation immunity differ as to their legal reasoning regarding the 
substantially certain standard, almost every court dealing with the 
topic turned to the opinions in Connelly, Cunningham, and Fisher for 
factual examples as to what does and does not constitute an inten-
tional tort under workers compensation law.82 In other words, while 
Florida courts may not have been sure what substantially certain 
means as a matter of law, many courts depended on the opinions in 
Connelly, Cunningham, and Fisher to decide what constitutes an in-
tentional tort as a matter of fact.83 By combining varying legal defini-
tions of substantially certain with the factual situations set forth in 
Fisher, Cunningham, and Connelly, post-1990 courts in Florida cre-
ated a very high burden for employees to overcome when challenging 
their employers workers compensation immunity.84 
 Despite the overwhelming majority of Florida court opinions that 
refused to find intentional torts under the substantially certain 
standard between 1991 and late 1998, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal issued two opinions within that timeframe which found that an 
employers alleged conduct did rise to the level of substantial cer-
tainty.85 In Belhomme v. Rigal Plastics, Inc.,86 the court held that a 
material issue of disputed fact existed as to whether an employers 
conduct was substantially certain to result in injury or death, due to 
the fact that the employer had removed one safety device from a 
plastics manufacturing machine.87 Unfortunately, the court in Bel-
homme did not expound on the reasoning behind its ruling, so the 
opinion is of little academic value.  
 In Myrick v. Luhrs Corporation,88 the court found that a plaintiff s 
complaint sufficiently alleged behavior that was substantially certain 
to result in injury or death to an employee.89 Specifically, the court in 
Myrick stated: 
Reading Myricks complaint most strongly in his favor as we must 
do, he alleged his employer deliberately removed or disabled five 
essential safety devices designed to allow an operator to run the 
saw without exposing himself to certain danger. Myrick also al-
                                                                                                                      
 82. See, e.g., Wilks, 691 So. 2d at 631; Gustafsons Dairy, Inc., 681 So. 2d at 790; 
Walton Dodge Chrysler-Plymouth Jeep & Eagle, Inc., 679 So. 2d at 830; Subileau, 664 So. 
2d at 12; Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc., 653 So. 2d at 1131; General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 632 So. 2d at 125; Timones, 631 So. 2d at 333. 
 83. See cases cited supra note 78. 
 84. See cases cited supra note 78. 
 85. See Myrick v. Luhrs Corp., 689 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Belhomme v. Ri-
gal Plastics, Inc., 625 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).  
 86. 625 So. 2d 118. 
 87. See id. 
 88. 689 So. 2d 416. 
 89. See id. at 419. 
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leged that he had no knowledge or warning he was being exposed 
to danger by merely operating the saw. From these allegations, 
one can infer some cover-up on the part of the employer.90 
 Referring to its opinion in Belhomme, the court in Myrick implied 
that if the removal of one safety switch from a dangerous machine 
raises an issue of material fact as to whether an employers behavior 
is substantially certain to result in injury, the removal of several 
safety switches accompanied by inferred deceit must state a claim in 
tort that would abrogate workers compensation immunity.91 As 
noted by Judge Emerson R. Thompson Jr. in his dissent in Myrick, 
however, the courts opinions in Belhomme and Myrick appear mis-
placed in light of other Fifth District opinions and opinions written 
by other Florida courts.92 In fact, the Belhomme and Myrick opinions 
appear to be anomalous and are admittedly close cases at best.93 
However, the opinions in Belhomme and Myrick aptly demonstrate 
the varying legal expectations and standards brought about by the 
Florida Supreme Courts ill-defined exception to employers workers 
compensation immunity. 
IV.   TURNER V. PCR, INC. AND THE CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY 
AS TO WHAT SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN MEANS 
A.   Turner v. PCR, Inc. 
 Recently, in Turner v. PCR, Inc.,94 the following question was cer-
tified to the Florida Supreme Court: 
Is an experts affidavit, expressing the opinion that an employer 
exhibited a deliberate intent to injure or engaged in conduct sub-
stantially certain to result in injury or death to an employee, suffi-
cient to constitute a factual dispute, thus precluding summary 
judgment on the issue of workers compensation immunity?95 
 In response to the certified question, the supreme court stated 
that in order to determine whether expert affidavits preclude sum-
mary judgment, we must first decide what a claimant-employee must 
show when attempting to prove the commission of an intentional tort 
by an employer in order to avoid an otherwise valid workers com-
pensation defense.96 With this said, the court went on to state, we 
                                                                                                                      
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing J.B. Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v. Shafer, 
663 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kline v. Rubino, 652 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); 
and Timones v. Excel Indus., 631 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)). 
 93. See Myrick, 689 So. 2d at 418 (stating that [t]his is a close case). 
 94. 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000).  
 95. Id. at 684. 
 96. Id. 
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recognize and reaffirm the existence of an intentional tort exception 
to an employers immunity, and hold that the conduct of the em-
ployer must be evaluated under an objective standard.97 In fact, the 
supreme court in Turner specifically reaffirmed its creation of the in-
tentional tort exception in Eller and its adoption of the substantially 
certain standard in Fisher and Lawton.98 However, in an unexpected 
move, the supreme court receded from its opinions in Fisher and 
Lawton to the extent that those opinions suggest that substantially 
certain to cause injury or death means virtually certain to cause in-
jury or death.99 The court also receded from its factual holdings in 
Fisher and Lawton to the extent that those opinions did not find be-
havior sufficient to constitute an intentional tort under the substan-
tially certain standard.100 Thus, in two passing footnotes, the su-
preme court in Turner overruled every case in Florida that has relied 
on the virtual certainty standard in Fisher and Lawton and/or 
every opinion that has relied on Fisher and Lawtons factual deter-
minations that certain behavior does not rise to the level of substan-
tial certainty. In addition to receding from Fisher and Lawton, the 
court in Turner stated as follows: 
Although we continue to find that substantial certainty requires 
a showing greater than gross negligence, we emphasize that the 
appropriate standard is substantial certainty, not the heightened 
virtual certainty standard. As noted earlier, we upheld legisla-
tion in Eller that created an exception to a managerial coem-
ployees immunity when the coemployee acted with culpable negli-
gence. That culpable negligence exception is not unlike the sub-
stantial certainty of injury exception we recognized in Fisher and 
Lawton.101 
 In other words, as opposed to the virtual certainty standard that 
the supreme court wrote of in Fisher and Lawton, the present mem-
bers of the supreme court now equate the substantially certain 
standard to the supervisory/managerial culpable negligence standard 
in section 440.11(1). After setting forth this new view of substan-
tially certain to cause injury or death, the court in Turner went on 
hold that the employers conduct at issue in that case raised a mate-
                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 687. 
 99. See id. at 687 n.4. The contention that this was an unexpected move from the 
court is based on the fact that the virtual certainty language in Fisher and Lawton had 
remained viable for 14 years without comment from the supreme court and the fact that 
many courts relied on the virtual certainty language as the basis for upholding workers 
compensation immunity. See cases cited supra, note 78. 
 100. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 101. Id. at 687 n.4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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rial issue for a jury to decide.102 Like many Florida courts before it, 
the court in Turner relied on the facts of Connelly and Cunningham 
to justify its finding of substantially certain behavior, thereby forti-
fying Connelly and Cunninghams positions as the de facto gauges 
of intentional behavior in workers compensation law.103  
B.   The Continued Uncertainty as to What 
 Substantially Certain Means 
 With the supreme courts decision in Turner, it seems that sub-
stantially certain to cause injury or death now means behavior: (1) 
that is akin to behavior that demonstrates a reckless indifference to 
the safety of injured employees (that is, culpable negligence);104 (2) 
that arises from repeated and continued conduct;105 and (3) that has 
an element of deceit that prevents an employee from exercis[ing] an 
informed judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.106 De-
spite this somewhat tortured definition that can be extrapolated from 
the courts opinion in Turner, the supreme courts recent attempt to 
clarify the meaning of substantially certain to cause injury or death 
falls short of being helpful. For example, the following questions, 
among others, remain unanswered after Turner: 
(1) Does behavior akin to culpable negligence, without an element 
of deceit, but with repeated and continued conduct, constitute an 
intentional tort? 
(2) Does behavior akin to culpable negligence, with an element of 
deceit, but without repeated and continued conduct, constitute an 
intentional tort? 
(3) Does behavior akin to culpable negligence, without an element 
of deceit, and without repeated and continued conduct, constitute 
an intentional tort? 
(4) What exactly is behavior akin to culpable negligence? 
                                                                                                                      
 102. See id. The court in Turner also took great pains to note that the standard by 
which substantial certainty is evaluated is an objective standard. To justify its discussion 
of this seemingly apparent fact, the court cited to two district-level opinions that arguably 
required true intent to injure rather than objective evaluations of the circumstances. See 
id. at 688. To the extent that the objectivity of the substantial certainty standard was 
ever an actual issue, the courts discussion of objectivity in Turner is correct. See 2 ARTHUR 
LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSONS WORKERS COMPENSATION § 68.15(c) (desk ed. 1999). 
 103. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690. For the proposition that Connelly and Cunningham 
are the de facto gauges of intentional behavior under Florida workers compensation law, 
see supra Part III.B.1. 
 104. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688 n.4, 689 n.5. 
 105. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). This 
reasoning from Cunningham was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 
690. 
 106. Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). This reason-
ing from Connelly was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690. 
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 Review of post-Turner court opinions that have addressed work-
ers compensation immunity to date evidences the remaining confu-
sion as to what constitutes an intentional tort. For example, in 
Holderbaum v. ITCO Holding Co.,107 the court held that although the 
behavior at issue in that case may have been perhaps grossly or 
even culpably [negligent], the behavior was not substantially certain 
to result in injury or death.108 With the supreme courts pronounce-
ment in Turner that substantially certain conduct is not unlike 
culpable negligence,109 one must wonder whether the court in 
Holderbaum was correct in drawing a distinction between culpable 
negligence and substantial certainty. Another example of confusion 
can be found in Gerth v. Wilson.110 A mere two months after the su-
preme courts opinion in Turner, the Second District Court of Appeal 
certified a question to the supreme court regarding the scope of 
workers compensation immunity.111 Thus, it appears that fourteen 
years after the intentional tort exception to an employers workers 
compensation immunity was contemplated in Fisher and Lawton, 
employers and employees in Florida still have no real understanding 
of what constitutes an intentional tort under the substantially cer-
tain standard. With this in mind, a legislatively defined exception to 
an employers workers compensation immunity appears to be in or-
der. 
V.   A CALL TO THE LEGISLATURE FOR A STATUTORILY DEFINED  
INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION 
 As argued above, courts in Florida do not have a workable defini-
tion of what constitutes an intentional tort under workers compensa-
tion law. Given this fact, employers and employees in Florida cannot 
reasonably depend on the exclusivity of the workers compensation 
remedy, and this uncertainty goes against the legislative intent of 
the workers compensation statute.112 Also as argued above, the 
courts in Florida have varied in their application of the intentional 
tort exception to employer immunity, and this lack of consistency 
                                                                                                                      
 107. 753 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), cert. denied, 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2269 (Fla. Nov. 
7, 2000). 
 108. Id. at 700. 
 109. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687 n.4. 
 110. 774 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
 111. See id. at 7. The certified question in Gerth asks the supreme court whether an 
OSHA violation abrogates workers compensation immunity if the violation in question 
subjects the employer to a term of imprisonment exceeding 60 days. See id.  
 112. See FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000) (stating that the policy behind workers compen-
sation law is to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to 
an injured worker and to facilitate the workers return to gainful employment at a reason-
able cost to the employer). 
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goes against the very nature of the judicial system.113 With these 
problems in mind, a logical solution appears to be a statutorily de-
fined exception for intentional torts committed by employers. 
A.   The Percentage Definition 
 With the need for a legislatively defined exception to workers 
compensation employer immunity argued, the remaining question is 
how a statutory exception should be defined.114 Although many inten-
tional tort exceptions are possible, this Article advances what can be 
called a percentage definition of intentional tort behavior. To ap-
preciate such a definition, one must first explore the nature of behav-
ior that is classified as intentional. 
 As noted by the Florida Supreme Court in Spivey, the distinction 
between intent and negligence boils down to a matter of degree.115 At 
the high end of the culpability spectrum is behavior that is inten-
tionally designed to harm another.116 For the purposes of this argu-
ment, actual intent to injure is classified with a 100% culpability rat-
ing. At the low end of culpability is behavior that unintentionally 
causes injury due to carelessness or negligence.117 Assume that sim-
ple negligence can be classified with a 20% culpability rating. Some-
where on the scale between actual intent to injure and negligence 
lies unintentional behavior that is so culpable that [actual] intent 
[to injure] is legally implied and [the behavior] becomes assault 
rather than unintentional negligence.118  
 With the aforementioned assumptions made, one can classify im-
plied intentional behavior as conduct that does not reach the 100% 
level of actual intent, but comes so close to it that the law will as-
sume that the conduct was intentional. How much culpability is ap-
propriate before imputing intentional conduct? Surely if actual intent 
is 100%, then implied intent should be at least 90%. This sort of per-
centage rating exercise forms the foundation of this Articles pro-
posed definition of an intentional tort exception to workers compen-
sation employer immunity. 
 If one were to take the percentage rating system used above and 
apply it to the substantially certain to cause injury or death stan-
                                                                                                                      
 113. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1349 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that our judicial system is founded on the premise that justice and consistency 
are related ideas); supra Parts III and IV.  
 114. This comment presupposes that an intentional tort exception to an employers 
workers compensation immunity is desirable. Although an argument can be made that in-
tentional torts should fall within the purview of workers compensation immunity, such 
normative arguments are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 115. Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. 
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dard used by Florida courts in evaluating workers compensation 
immunity, one could arrive at a percentage figure that better ex-
plains what constitutes an excluded intentional tort. For example, 
the phrase substantially certain to occur might be fairly defined as 
an event that has at least a 75% chance of occurring.119 Thus, the 
phrase substantially certain to result in injury or death can be read 
as 75% certain to cause injury or death. 
 The problem with this definition of substantial certainty is that a 
75% chance of injury does not square with the assumed 90% level of 
culpability used to define implied intentional behavior above. In 
other words, if one views implied intentional behavior as behavior 
that is almost as culpable as actual intentional behavior (90% culpa-
bility out of 100%), then it does not logically follow that a 75% chance 
of injury can be equated with an implied intent to injure an em-
ployee. What this also suggests is that substantial certainty simply 
does not rise to a level of implied intent. 
 The phrase virtually certain to occur, however, can be fairly de-
fined as an event that has at least a 90% chance of occurring.120 If one 
reads substantially certain to cause injury or death as virtually 
certain to cause injury or death, then the 90% chance of an employee 
being injured or killed squares with the 90% culpability rating given 
to implied intentional behavior. Stated another way, if one views im-
plied intentional behavior as behavior that is almost as culpable as 
actual intentional behavior (90% culpability out of 100%), then it 
logically follows that a 90% chance of injury can be equated with an 
implied intent to injure an employee.121 In fact, this equality between 
virtual certainty and implied intent could explain the supreme 
courts earlier use of the term virtual certainty in further defining 
                                                                                                                      
 119. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (equating a sub-
stantial risk of death with a 75% percent chance of death); Eagle v. North Dakota Workers 
Compensation Bureau, 583 N.W.2d 97, 102 (N.D. 1998) (referencing a statute that finds 
substantial gainful employment as 75%); Davis v. OHara, No. 92-3314-I, 2000 WL 336749, 
at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (referencing a regulation that finds substantial compliance as 
75% compliance); Taylor v. Shigaki, 930 P.2d 340, 344 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (finding sub-
stantial performance of a contract when an opening settlement offer comprised 75% of in-
surance policy limits).  
 120. See, e.g., Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that a 90% protection rate of immunization eliminated virtually any potential 
harm). 
 121. The author is aware that a quantified culpability percentage and a percentage 
chance of injury are not necessarily co-equal. For example, an employer with an actual in-
tent to injure has a 100% culpability rating even if the employer attempts to injure an em-
ployee in a manner that has a very low percentage chance of actually causing injury. In 
such a case, an employer with actual intent could be held criminally responsible for at-
tempting to injure an employee, even if the employee was not actually injured. In the 
realm of implied intent and workers compensation immunity, however, implied intent is 
primarily driven by the degree of risk associated with an employers conduct, thus making 
the degree of risk and culpability interrelated. 
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the phrase substantially certain to cause injury or death in Fisher 
and Lawton.122  
 With the fundamental precepts of a percentage definition of im-
plied intentional behavior defined, a proposed intentional tort excep-
tion to employer workers compensation immunity can be offered. 
Further, the 90% culpability rating seems most appropriate for defin-
ing implied intentional behavior; in turn, 90% seems more aptly de-
scribed as virtually certain. Thus, the following intentional tort ex-
ception should be used in section 440.11, Florida Statutes: 
Pursuant to this section, employers are provided with immunity 
from suit by their employees so long as the employer has not en-
gaged in any intentional act designed to result in or that is virtu-
ally certain to result in serious injury or death to the employee. An 
act is considered to be virtually certain to result in serious injury 
or death to an employee when that act will result in serious injury 
or death 90% of the times that the act is done.123 
 With this proposed definition stated, however, some additional 
questions arise. As noted in Part IV.B., the current Turner definition 
of substantially certain to cause injury or death is behavior that: (1) 
is akin to behavior that demonstrates a reckless indifference to the 
safety of injured employees (that is, culpable negligence);124 (2) arises 
from repeated and continued conduct;125 and (3) has an element of 
deceit that prevents an employee from exercis[ing] an informed 
judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.126 Although the 
proposed percentage definition detailed above vitiates subsection 
(1) of the Turner definition, the elements of deceit and continued 
conduct in subsections (2) and (3) must be addressed. 
                                                                                                                      
 122. See Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986), 
overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8; Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 
498 So. 2d 882, 884 (Fla. 1986), overruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 123. This proposed definition may raise concerns with some readers due to the fact 
that an actual percentage is used to quantify the term virtual certainty. Specifically, 
some might argue that using a percentage will invite a war of experts in which plaintiffs 
experts proffer that conduct was 90% certain to cause injury while defense experts claim 
that the relevant conduct was below 90%. While such concerns may or may not be well-
founded, the author asserts that a numeric quantification would serve as a stable guide-
post that courts could use to determine substantial and/or virtual certainty, rather than 
the current system of I know it when I see it. Under the current court-created intentional 
tort exception, one judge may view substantially certain conduct as conduct that is more 
likely than not to result in injury (51%) while another judge may view such conduct as 
imminent and sure to occur (99%). With the proposed percentage exception, the two hypo-
thetical judges above could issue consistent rulings by relying on a legislative definition 
within section 440.11. 
 124. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 688 n.4, 689 n.5 (Fla. 2000). 
 125. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). This 
reasoning from Cunningham was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 
690. 
 126. See Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). This rea-
soning from Connelly was adopted by the court in Turner. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690. 
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1.   Repeated and Continued Conduct 
 As discussed above, the court in Connelly suggested that sub-
stantially certain conduct must be coupled with an element of re-
peated and continued actions on the part of an employer.127 Under 
the statutory intentional tort exception proposed in this Article, con-
tinued and repeated conduct by the employer might or might not fac-
tor into a courts determination of whether certain behavior was 
virtually certain to result in injury or death. For instance, an 
employer may repeatedly ask its employees to work in conditions 
that have a 50% chance of resulting in injury or death. But under the 
proposed provision, no matter how many times an employer asks its 
employees to work in such conditions, the employers conduct would 
never rise to the level of virtual certainty; a 50% chance of risk will 
not equal a 90% chance of risk no matter how many times an 
employee is exposed to that risk. On the other hand, if an employer 
engages in repeated and continued conduct that acts to increase an 
employees risk of injury each time the employer acts, such repeated 
and continued conduct could eventually result in virtual certainty. 
An example of such behavior would be where an employer asks an 
employee to fly an airplane that is low on oil. The risk of flying the 
aircraft with low oil may initially be a 60% chance of injury or death, 
but each time the employer has the employee fly, the risk increases 
by 5%. As the increased risk of injury to the employee draws closer to 
the 90% virtual certainty mark, the employers repeated and 
continued conduct moves closer to being an intentional tort. 
Therefore, rather than being an independent element of an implied 
intentional tort, repeated and continued behavior on the part of an 
employer is merely a factor in determining the risk of harm to an 
employee under the proposed statutory definition. 
2.   Elements of Deceit 
 The third apparent element of the Turner definition of substan-
tially certain is that an employers conduct must have an element of 
deceit that prevents an employee from exercis[ing] an informed 
judgment whether to perform [an] assigned task.128 In the statutory 
exception proposed in this Article, however, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion by an employer is merely a factor to be considered in determin-
ing virtual certainty, much like the issue of repeated and continued 
behavior discussed above. For example, suppose that an employer 
asks an employee to engage in activity that has a 75% chance of in-
                                                                                                                      
 127. See Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451. 
 128. Id.; see also Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690; cases cited supra note 78. 
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jury or death. This act alone would not meet the 90% virtual cer-
tainty standard. 
 If, however, the employer conceals the risks associated with the 
activity so that the employee cannot exercise informed judgment as 
to how to safely perform the task or whether to perform the assigned 
task at all, then the risk of injury to the employee may, but may not 
be enhanced to the virtual certainty standard. A good example would 
be where an employer asks an employee to mix certain volatile 
chemicals together and lies to the employee by telling her that the 
mixture will not be toxic. Although mixing the chemicals while wear-
ing protective equipment has, say, a 50% chance of causing injury or 
death, the employers lie by causing the employee to forgo the use of 
protective gear, might raise the risk of injury or death to as much as 
95%. In this scenario, the employer would be liable for an intentional 
tort due to the fact that his or her misrepresentation caused the risk 
of injury to increase to 95%. In other words, concealment, misrepre-
sentation, or deceit may raise the risk of injury associated with a 
given task from below 90% to 90% or greater. Therefore, deceitful 
employer behavior can easily be factored into a courts virtual cer-
tainty evaluation.129 
B.   The Percentage Definition Applied to Past Florida Cases 
 With a proposed intentional tort exception set forth, a question 
remains as to how a percentage definition of intentional behavior 
would work in real life. By taking factual scenarios from past work-
ers compensation immunity cases in Florida and applying the excep-
tion proposed herein, one can see how a proposed percentage defini-
tion would work in practice. 
 1.   Virtual Certainty Without Deceit or Repeated Conduct 
 As noted above, the virtual certainty standard proposed in this 
Article would require a 90% chance of serious injury or death to de-
feat an employers workers compensation immunity. With a slight 
modification, the facts found in Fisher present an excellent example 
of what would constitute virtual certainty without any acts of deceit 
or repeated and continuous conduct. Recall that in Fisher, the plain-
tiffs complaint alleged that the defendant-employer required its em-
ployees to enter pipes that contained poisonous gases in order to 
                                                                                                                      
 129. It is important to note that under the exception proposed in this Article, deceitful 
conduct in and of itself does not lead to an intentional tort. In some cases, an employer 
may tell numerous lies and make numerous misrepresentations, but the risk of injury to 
an employee may still remain very low. This author asserts that this distinction is an im-
portant one, but it is not clear under Floridas current intentional tort exception to work-
ers compensation immunity. 
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clean the pipes with high-pressure hoses.130 The plaintiff further al-
leged that the employer failed to provide its employees with oxygen 
masks, gas detection equipment, rescue equipment, and other safety 
equipment required under federal law.131 Assume, however, that the 
poisonous gas in Fisher was cyanide as opposed to methane gas. As-
sume further that the employees in Fisher knew that the pipes con-
tained toxic gases, and that their employer had forced the employees 
to clean the pipes just this once under the threat of termination. In 
such a case, any reasonable judge would find that the employer in 
the modified Fisher scenario had subjected its employees to a virtual 
certainty of injury or death. First, as a matter of mere common sense, 
most reasonable laymen would likely believe that subjecting an un-
protected human to cyanide gas fumes in a close-quartered environ-
ment would result in injury or death at least 90 out of 100 times.132 
Secondly, a plaintiff in the aforementioned scenario could use expert 
testimony to prove that of 100 persons subjected to concentrated cya-
nide gas, 90 would die.133 Although the application of the 90% stan-
dard in this example requires the use of some subjective gut feel-
ings, a percentage definition provides a stable guidepost that can be 
used to focus intuitive evaluations made by judges and juries.134  
2.   Virtual Certainty via Continued and Repeated Behavior 
 In Connelly, the evidence before the court suggested that the em-
ployer of the deceased plaintiffs engaged in the following acts: (1) in-
tentionally misstating the weight capacity of an aircraft; (2) inten-
tionally and repeatedly keeping its aircraft in a defective condition; 
(3) concealing actual flight loads which resulted in reduced thrust 
and erroneous fuel calculations; (4) ignoring reports of imminent 
equipment failure; and (5) economically coercing employees to fly in 
violation of Federal Aviation Association regulations.135 To illustrate 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986), over-
ruled in part by Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691 n.8. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Admittedly, the author has no evidence to support this proposition. However, the 
assertion made here seems to be pure common sense, just as one might reasonably assume 
that at least 90 persons out of 100 jumping off of the Empire State Building would die. 
 133. The use of expert testimony to help prove implied intentional torts is not a novel 
proposition in Florida workers compensation law. In fact, the plaintiffs in Turner used ex-
pert testimony to help establish their case. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684 
(Fla. 2000).  
 134. A good analogue is the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil 
cases. Simply asking a jury to find whether a case has been proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence invites the same problematic subjectivity that has plagued the substantially 
certain standard used by Florida courts in deciding workers compensation immunity 
questions. However, if the same jury is instructed that a preponderance of the evidence is 
more than 50%, the chance of varying decisions is minimized.  
 135. Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
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how the proposed standard might be applied to these facts, first as-
sume that each time the employer forced its employees to fly in an 
aircraft, the chance of injury or death to the employees was 65%. In 
such a scenario, the employers behavior would not rise to the level of 
virtual certainty and thus would never constitute an intentional tort. 
While the employers repeated behavior might constitute culpable 
negligence (meaning a reckless indifference to the employees 
safety),136 it would not constitute implied intent to injure the employ-
ees under the virtual certainty standard.137  
 However, assume that the Connelly employers failure to address 
continued reports of imminent equipment failure on its airplanes in-
creased the risk associated with each flight by 5%. Each time that 
the crew was forced to fly the defective aircraft, the employers con-
duct would move closer to being an intentional tort. When and if the 
airplane in question finally crashed, a judge or jury could look at the 
totality of the employers behavior to determine whether the risk of 
the final flight had risen to 90% or greater. Obviously, expert testi-
mony could be used to substantiate the per flight increase of risk that 
would be added to the base risk of flying a defective aircraft. 
3.   Virtual Certainty via Deceit 
 In some workplace situations, employees may be forced to work 
with dangerous chemicals or substances. The risk of working with 
such substances may be high, but the use of precaution and proper 
protective gear may lower that risk to acceptable levels. In Cunning-
ham, as discussed above, the employer removed warning labels on 
toxic substances, misrepresented the toxic nature of substances to its 
employees, knowingly provided inadequate safety equipment to its 
employees, and misrepresented the level of toxic substances present 
in its plant.138 Assume for the sake of argument that the risk of in-
jury from working with the toxic substances in Cunningham was 
25% if protective gear were used and proper precautions were taken. 
Further assume that the risk of injury without protective gear and 
precautions was 95%. By misrepresenting the need for safety equip-
ment and precautions to its employees, the employer in this scenario 
would have prevented the employees from reducing their 95% expo-
sure to serious injury down to 25%, and it would thus be liable in 
tort.  
                                                                                                                      
 136. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 689 n.5 (Fla. 2000). 
 137. One must keep in mind that indifference to injury and an intent to injure are two 
different things. Although being indifferent to whether an employee is injured is reprehen-
sible, it is not, by definition, the same as actual or implied intent to injure. 
 138. Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 
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4.   No Virtual Certainty 
 In Mekamy Oaks, Inc. v. Snyder,139 an employee, Leon Snyder, 
used a riding lawn mower in the normal course of his employment as 
a groundskeeper.140 At some point, the lawn mower in question began 
losing power, and Snyders supervisor told him that a malfunctioning 
safety switch on the mower was causing the power loss.141 After de-
termining the origin of the power loss, Snyders supervisor told him 
that he was going to remove the safety switch to solve the problem.142 
Snyder remarked to his supervisor that someone could be injured by 
operating the mower without the safety switch but continued to use 
the mower for several days after the switch was removed without in-
cident.143 Some time after the switch was removed, however, Snyder 
operated the mower on a sloped surface and the mower reared up 
and ejected Snyder causing the mower blade to cut his foot.144 Snyder 
contended that the safety switch that had been removed would have 
prevented his injuries.145  
 In the factual scenario above, it can be argued that there was not 
a 90% chance of serious injury or death to Snyder and thus no inten-
tional tort under workers compensation law.146 Put in simple terms, 
the average persons experience with riding lawnmowers is that they 
rarely rear up and eject the rider at an angle which causes the riders 
foot to be exposed to the blade that is housed on the underside of the 
mower. In Mekamy Oaks, Snyders accident appears to have been a 
fluke in that the injury was predicated on the following combination 
of facts: (1) he drove the subject lawnmower on a sloped surface 
which caused the mower to rear up; (2) the rearing action caused him 
to be ejected; (3) the rearing action exposed the mower blade at an 
angle that crossed Snyders trajectory as he fell from the mower; and 
(4) Snyders exposure to the blade was sufficient to cause serious in-
jury.147 In such a case, an expert could be used to testify as to the 
                                                                                                                      
 139. 659 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). 
 140. Id. at 1291. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Again, the author has no hard evidence to support this position but instead relies 
on a reasonable gut feeling based on the proposed virtual certainty standard. Although 
relying on gut feelings is not an ideal method of administering justice, the court in 
Mekamy Oaks appeared to do just that, considering that the opinion gives no commentary 
to support its holding that Snyders employer did not commit an intentional tort. See id. 
With the proposed percentage definition of virtual certainty, the court in Mekamy Oaks 
could have expressed its intuitive decision in quantifiable percentage-of-risk terms, rather 
than simply findingwithout commentthat the behavior in question did not rise to the 
level of an intentional tort.   
 147. See id. 
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unlikelihood of all four of these events coming together and the cu-
mulative risk of serious injury if they did. 
 As seen from the four examples above, the application of the per-
centage definition offered in this Article yields logical results that are 
consistent with the policies behind Floridas workers compensation 
law. When applied to real life workers compensation immunity 
cases, the proposed virtual certainty definition minimizes the need 
for unbridled subjective court decisions and provides a stable eviden-
tiary standard that can be developed with expert testimony.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 In Florida, workers compensation law plays an important social 
role due to the fact that it assure[s] the quick and efficient delivery 
of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and facili-
tate[s] the workers return to gainful employment at a reasonable 
cost to the employer.148 For the provision of workers compensation 
benefits to be effective, employers and employees alike must re-
nounce some of their common law rights and defenses under the law 
and look to workers compensation as the exclusive remedy for quali-
fying workplace injuries.149 
 With this fact in mind, the exclusivity provisions found in Flor-
idas workers compensation statutes must be applied consistently 
and with equal force to both employers and employees. Under the 
current court-created intentional tort exception to an employers im-
munity, employers and employees in Florida have no reasonable cer-
tainty as to the scope of the workers compensation remedy. This un-
certainty degrades the policies behind workers compensation law. 
 Instead of relying on the ill-defined and subjective intentional tort 
exception created by the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida Legisla-
ture should enact an intentional tort exception that can be applied in 
a fair and consistent manner. Adopting a standard that requires a 
probability of 90% to show virtual certainty to cause serious injury 
or death, the legislature could provide clear, objective guidance as to 
what sort of behavior constitutes an implied intentional tort that 
would abrogate an employers workers compensation immunity. 
With such a statutorily defined exception in place, courts in Florida 
could evaluate the exclusivity of the workers compensation remedy 
in a fair and consistent manner that furthers the policies that lie at 
the heart of workers compensation law. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 148. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000). 
 149. See id. 
